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MTRODUCTION
David W. Burcham*
This is the second year that the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view has sponsored a symposium as a tribute to the late Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr. Last year, the symposium focused on the contri-
butions that Justice Brennan made to the law generally and to
lawyering in particular. This year we have narrowed the focus, ex-
amining Justice Brennan's legacy in the art of judging. To consider
this subject, we offer the insights of three distinguished federal
judges-all of whom at one time during their careers served as Chief
Judge of their respective circuits-and of a distinguished scholar
who served as a law clerk for Justice Brennan.
The Honorable Abner Mikva argues that Justice Brennan's ap-
proach to deciding cases demonstrated that a judge could use the tra-
ditional tools of judicial interpretation and still "do justice and move
the legal landscape forward." In interpreting the broad sweeping
clauses of the Constitution, Justice Brennan did not attempt to con-
fine himself to contemporary notions of what the drafters of those
provisions may have intended or meant in 1789. Rather, those broad
and generalized phrases-like the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against "cruel and unusual punishments"-invite succeeding genera-
tions of judges to infuse them with meaning that reflects evolving
standards of decency and morality. Judge Mikva opines that Justice
Brennan's greatest accomplishment on the Court was his opinion in
Baker v. Carr,' which was joined by six other justices. The principle
of "one person, one vote" established by Baker, restricted states'
ability to configure voting districts in a way that effectively disen-
franchised a large number of citizens. Judge Mikva also asserts that
this principle laid the doctrinal foundation for the Voting Rights Act
of 1964.
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Judge Richard Arnold provides a personal account of how his
approach to judging has been influenced by Justice Brennan. Judge
Arnold describes Justice Brennan's decisional process as applied to a
little-known case that the Court heard during the term that Judge
Arnold clerked for Justice Brennan. Judge Arnold identifies several
lessons that emerged from this process. First, a judge should per-
form judicial functions quickly. Second, opinions do not need to be
lengthy; indeed, brevity is often a virtue. Third, opinions should be
written in clear concise prose and should not be stilted or full of le-
galisms. Fourth, judges should realize that a great deal about the
judging process never becomes public; "internal cogitation" has its
place and a judge need not explain it in lengthy detail. Finally, there
is no such thing as a "little case." Cases always involve a contro-
versy between two or more parties, and a judge must never lose sight
of the fact that each decision made should seek to advance the cause
of justice.
In an interesting historically-based piece, Judge Ruggero J.
Aldisert traces the conceptual underpinnings of Justice Brennan's
style of judging to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and
Benjamin Cardozo. Each of these three judges espoused a judicial
philosophy that judges should consider the effect of their judicial de-
cisions on society and social welfare, and eschew adherence to a
"mechanical jurisprudence of legal conceptions only." Judging nec-
essarily and legitimately involves interstitial lawmaking. Judge
Aldisert argues that Justice Brennan not only accepted this philoso-
phy, but extended it to those cases that involved settled legal precepts
that he felt were inconsistent with evolving standards of morality.
Justice Brennan sought to decide cases in a manner so that "the qual-
ity of human life can be spirited, improving and unimpaired." But,
Judge Aldisert argues, this approach contains inherent limitations be-
cause it has the tendency "to supplant the common law tradition of
principled decision-making." Judge Aldisert suggests that predict-
ability is an essential attribute of our legal system, and that it is se-
verely threatened when a judge's "idiosyncratic views of desirable
social welfare" are brought about by judicial decision.
Finally, Professor Larry Kramer suggests that Justice Brennan
was special, not because he surpassed the intellectual stature of Jus-
tices like Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stevens, Scalia,
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Rehnquist, or White, or because he was an extraordinarily successful
coalition builder, but because his greatness derived from who he was
as a person. Professor Kramer observes that Justice Brennan was
someone who did not hate. He was extraordinary because he "had a
genuine, almost automatic empathy for everyone and everything."
Justice Brennan's continuing legacy is that as a person and as a judge
he inspired people to strive to be better.
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